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ARTICLE
UNiTED STATES V. JONES: BIG BROTHER AND THE
"COMMON GOOD"




In the center of the town of Siena, Italy, lays the
Palazzo Publico which was built between 1297 and 1310.
Inside the Palazzo Publico is the Sala della Pace, the Hall
of Peace, which houses an early piece of Italian secular art-
a fresco that illustrates the effect government has on the
city, its people, and the countryside.' The painter,
Ambrogio Lorenzetti, depicted the "Common Good" as a
king, sitting tall and strong above a line of smaller-sized,
everyday people who are slowly making their way towards
the "Common Good."2  This picture represents the
subordination of private interest to the common good.3
Lorenzetti, who painted the fresco between 1338
and 1339, was one of the first of many who began to
ponder what makes a good government;4 he concluded that
all citizens must make personal sacrifices for the common
* Assistant Professor of Law, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan
School of Law. I want to thank the participants at the Sixth Circuit
Judicial Conference in Lexington, Kentucky, where I presented
Trespass and the Expectation of Privacy: The Impact of United States
v. Jones on Law Enforcement and Private Entities, a precursor to this
article. I would like to thank Victoria Herman, Barbara Bavis, Mary
Laflin, and Bob Reid for their invaluable assistance on this article.
' MARIA LuISA MEONI, UTOPIA AND REALITY IN AMBROGIO
LORENZETrI's GOOD GOVERNMENT 9 (2005).
2 Id. at 16.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 13.
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good of the town.5 Most modem day democracies struggle
with the concept of the rights of individuals versus the
needs of the state. In light of rapid technological
advancement of the past fifty years, one of the biggest
issues citizens of the world face today is whether to
sacrifice some right to privacy for the common good, so
that the scales of Justice may remain in balance and to
promote the order Lorenzetti painted centuries ago.
In 1787, the United States Constitution was drafted
to establish mechanisms for an effective federal
government, which would become the "Common Good".
However, the Constitution contained few guarantees as to
what private interests would be protected in this new
government. Without the protection of individual rights,
this new central government had the potential to create
tyranny and transform into a police state of some sort.
James Madison stated that a declaration of rights would
help install the judiciary as "guardians" of individual
6rights. And so, in 1789, the first Congress proposed 12
amendments to the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment
was the most important of these for the protection of
privacy rights.
This article will trace the evolution of Fourth
Amendment law, what constitutes a "search" which
evolved from English property law and notions of trespass,
to the reasonable expectation of privacy under United
States v. Katz. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
United States v. Jones,8 which relied upon historical
property law, impacts law enforcement's future ability to
use tracking devices, especially when exigent
'Id at 16.
6 John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1311, 1394-95 (1997) (citing James Madison, Remarks to the
House of Representatives (June 8, 1789), in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY REVIEW (1971)).
7 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
2
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circumstances exist.9 The Jones case forces law
enforcement and the courts to reevaluate the extent of an
individual's right to privacy in the age of new technology
and the complications this may have on the ability of law
enforcement to utilize warrantless electronic monitoring,
technical surveillances, and other investigative techniques.
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Jones
based its decision on early Fourth Amendment law;
therefore, Part II of this article will provide a brief
overview and history of the Fourth Amendment and the
concerns of the Framers. It is important to review what
constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment and
provide a history of how the Court has viewed tracking
devices and other law enforcement tools that enhance
criminal investigations.
Part III of this article will examine the Jones
decision and its impact on law enforcement, as trespass is
now considered an additional argument towards what is
considered a "search." The Jones decision raises legal and
ethical issues for law enforcement working with companies
such as OnStar, which allow for monitoring without
installation, any type of factory- or owner-installed tracking
device, or GPS-enabled smartphones and raises issues for
law enforcement who find themselves in exigent
circumstances without the ability to place tracking devices
on automobiles and other such "effects." The Jones
decision may also have implications on other investigatory
tools, such as trash pulls, stationary cameras, open fields,
and undercover agent or informant non-consensual
recordings.
Part IV will explore private investigators' tort
liability, specifically the tort of trespass and invasion of
privacy, which can, in turn, enlighten the discussion as to
the impact of Jones on law enforcement. Post-Jones, the
Supreme Court should consider similar trespass and
9 Id.
3
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privacy laws but in the civil context. Private investigators
frequently utilize similar techniques and resources which
are the stock and trade of law enforcement, but private
investigators are governed by state licensing requirements.
Private investigators are also concerned with potential civil
tort liability and the admissibility of evidence collected by
them in any future criminal proceeding.
Previously, the rules which govern trespass in a
criminal context and civil proceeding were quite different.
The decision in Jones brings the common law tort of
trespass back into the criminal context. It can be argued
that there is an unwarranted dichotomy between what the
public, e.g., private investigator, is entitled to view versus
what law enforcement is entitled to view. The torts of
"trespass" and "invasion of privacy" used in the civil,
public context may now come into the forefront in
determining similar legal guidelines and constraints for law
enforcement. Investigative techniques such as open fields,
aerial surveillance, trash searches, undercover recordings,
and database searches may now be scrutinized under the
tort "trespass" theory.
The Court acknowledged in Jones that there may be
an "end to privacy" and the law of trespass may take its
place as society's subjective expectations of privacy are
becoming more and more reduced.' 0 This article will
discuss the relationship between Fourth Amendment law
for public officers, tort law for private investigators, and
the impact of Jones in their respective duties and
investigatory behavior. The trespass model should be
considered in the application of other methods of
investigation, and due to the ever-fluctuating state of
individual privacy expectations, an analysis similar to the
tort of invasion of privacy should supplement the Katz
analysis.
1o Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962.
4
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II. The Fourth Amendment and What
Constitutes a "Search"
When drafting the Fourth Amendment, the Framers
were concerned with the exercise of discretionary authority
by public officers and abusive warrants, such as writs of
assistance and general warrants.' The Framers wanted to
ensure that the right to privacy extended to an individual's
home; they recalled the practice of British customs agents
who were authorized via the writs of assistance to search
colonists' homes for taxable goods which included small
items such as salt, soap, paper, and glass.12 The writ was
effective during the entire lifetime of the reigning
sovereign, and the delegation to the official to enforce the
writ was absolute and unlimited. Therefore, the Framers
believed the chief evil was the physical entry into one's
home without a proper warrant.13 To rectify this abuse,
henceforth, any intrusion into one's home without a
warrant, i.e., without judicial scrutiny, would constitute a
"search" and a violation under the Fourth Amendment.
The Framers decided the Fourth Amendment would
apply to "persons, houses, papers, and effects."' 4 Scholars,
over the years, determined that the Fourth Amendment
contains three separate requirements: a warrant
requirement, a reasonableness requirement, and a
particularity requirement.' 5 The Fourth Amendment does
not explicitly discuss an individual's right to privacy.
While courts may remain confident that any
warrantless, government-sponsored intrusion into the home
would violate the Framer's intent behind the Fourth
Amendment, new technologies have evolved that now
" 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION 52 (5th ed. 2010).
I 2 Id.
13 Id. at 53.
14 Id.
" Id. at 50-51.
5
9.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 12
allow law enforcement to secure evidence within the home
without physically entering the home. The question now
being considered is whether this non-intrusive government
technique qualifies as a "search" and if so, whether this
"search" triggers the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
The courts originally looked to property law and the
common law tort of trespass to frame what constitutes a
"search." In Boyd v. United States,16 the Supreme Court
quoted Lord Camden, stating "every invasion of private
property, be it ever so minute is a trespass."' 7 The Court
also used "trespass" as a trigger for the Fourth Amendment
to apply when it reviewed the case against Roy Olmstead,
who ran a large bootleg operation in the Puget Sound
area.' Olmstead, a former police lieutenant, sold a
substantial amount of illegal liquor in the Seattle,
Washington area after the Volstead Act was passed in
1925.19 Olmstead sold his liquor out of an office in
downtown Seattle and had six telephone numbers that
buyers could use to contact his operation.20
Prohibition Bureau agents wiretapped the phones in
Olmstead's office and home by placing devices in the
basement of his office and in phone installations near his
and other employees' homes.2 The Ninth Circuit upheld
22Olmstead's eventual conviction. Justice Taft later wrote
16116 U.S. 616 (1886).
" Id. at 627.
18 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455-56 (1928).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 456.
21 Id. at 456-57.
22 Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842 (Wash. Ct. App. 1927).
Justice Frank H. Rudkin dissented and wrote:
What is the distinction between a message sent by
letter and a message sent by telegraph or by
telephone? True, the one is visible, the other
invisible; the one is tangible, the other intangible; the
6
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the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Olmstead, Taft
relied upon the trespass precedent, stating that the
wiretapping that occurred outside Olmstead's office and
home did not constitute a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment because there was no trespass or no physical
invasion of a protected location such as the home or
office.23
one is sealed, and the other unsealed; but these are
distinctions without a difference. A person using the
telegraph or telephone is not broadcasting to the
world. His conversation is sealed from the public as
completely as the nature of the instrumentalities
employed will permit, and no federal officer or
federal agent has a right to take his message from the
wires, in order that it may be used against him. Such
a situation would be deplorable and intolerable, to
say the least. Must the millions of people who use the
telephone every day for lawful purposes have their
messages interrupted and intercepted in this way? ...
If ills such as these must be borne, our forefathers
signally failed in their desire to ordain and establish a
government to secure the blessings of liberty to
themselves and their posterity.
Id. at 850 (Rudkin, J dissenting).
23 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465. Justice Taft explains:
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The
evidence was secured by the use of the sense of
hearing and that only. There was no entry of the
house or offices of the defendants. . . The reasonable
view is that one who installs in his house a telephone
instrument with connecting wires intends to project
his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires
beyond his house, and messages while passing over
them are not within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Here those who intercepted the
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This rationale held firm in the Goldman24 case in
1942 and the Silverman case of 1961.25 In Goldman, agents
placed a detectaphone26 against the outside wall of an
office and monitored the conversation from the outside wall
using the detectaphone.27 The Court found that there had
been no physical trespass into the office, and therefore,
there was no search or seizure.28 In Silverman, a spike mike
was inserted into the wall of an adjoining row house to
capture Silverman's conversations.29 Since the mike made
contact with the targeted row house's heating duct, the
Court found that a physical intrusion occurred which
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 30
The year 1967 began the Katz revolution, which
fundamentally altered the Court's understanding of Fourth
Amendment privacy protections. 3 1 Katz, a professional
gambler, used a bank of telephones on Sunset Boulevard to
place bets for himself and others.32 The Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") attached a tape recorder to the roof of
the middle phone booth, placed a microphone on the back
of two of the booths and attached an "out of order" sign on
the other booth.33 Since the FBI placed the listening device
on the outside of the phone booth, the government could
argue there was no physical intrusion, no trespass, inside
24 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
25 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
26 A detectaphone is a telephonic apparatus with an attached
microphone transmitter used especially for listening secretly.
Detectaphone - Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/detectaphone (last visited
June 18, 2012).
27 Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131-32.
28 Id. at 134.
29 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 506.
30 ld. at5ll-12.
3' Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
32 Id. at 348.
3 Brief of Petitioner at *5, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(No. 35), 1967 WL 113605.
8
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the booth. Justice Stewart disagreed and seemed to
overturn years of Fourth Amendment law by arguing the
Fourth Amendment protected "people, not places." 35 It did
not matter whether the device was placed inside or outside
the booth, "what a person seeks to preserve as private even
in an area accessible to the public may be constitutionally
protected." 36 Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, set the
stage for future Fourth Amendment cases. The pertinent
question for future Fourth Amendment cases was to
become whether the governmental action violated the
defendant's subjective expectation of privacy and if so, was
that expectation of privacy one that society considers
reasonable. 3 7
Law enforcement's invasion of privacy in the 18th
century was limited to physical searches of homes and
businesses. Once technology advanced, the Court seemed
to abandon the tort of trespass as the sole standard, and the
invasion of property was now possible without an
accompanying trespass. Police now have the ability to
invade one's privacy through wiretaps, informant or
undercover recordings, pen registers, aerial surveillance,
trash searches, thermal imaging, tracking devices, etc.
By the 2 0th century, the trespass doctrine alone
provided inadequate protection of Fourth Amendment
rights because technology had reached the point that it was
now possible for law enforcement to intercept
communications and monitor individuals without the
requirement of physical trespass. The trespass doctrine was
substituted for Katz in 1967, which said that a violation of
the Fourth Amendment occurs when government officers
violate a "reasonable expectation of privacy." 38 Under
34 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
35 Id. at 351.
36 Id. (internal citations omitted).
37 Id. at 360-62 (Harlan, J. concurring).
3 Id. at 360 (Harlan, J. concurring).
9
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Katz, the expectation of privacy doctrine was born, and
using this new analysis, the Court decided what constituted
a "search" 39 under the Fourth Amendment.40
III. The Jones decision and its Impact on Law
Enforcement
As the Court began to consider various
investigatory tools and whether these tools constituted a
"search" that would require a warrant, the issue of
electronic beepers and tracking devices arose. In United
States v. Knotts,4 1 police placed a radio transmitter42, also
called a beeper, in a container and traced the beeper in the
39 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 at n. 4 (2001) (use of thermal
imaging is a "search"); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300
(1987) (trespassing on curtilage is a "search"); Katz, 389 U.S. at 358
(wiretapping is a "search").
40 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (aerial surveillance is not
a "search"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (aerial
surveillance is not a "search"); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
40-41 (1988) (looking through trash is not a "search"); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984) (says searches of open fields is not a
4th Amendment violation but searches of curtilage would be a
violation); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (use or
inspection of pen registers is not a "search"); Cal. Bankers Ass'n v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974) (looking at bank records is not a
"search"); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1971) (use of
false friends or wired confidential informants are not "searches");
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (use of searchlights
does not create a "search" that implicates the 4th Amendment); United
States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (use of a
flashlight did not create a search, but was a plain view search); People
v. Vermouth, 116 Cal. Rptr. 675, 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (use of
binoculars to confirm what is seen with unaided observation is not a
"search").
41 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
42 A radio transmitter, which is usually battery operated, emits periodic
signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver. Marshall Brian, How
Radio Works, How STuFF WORKS,
http://howstuffworks.com/radio.htm (last visited August 6, 2012).
10
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container to Knotts' cabin.43 The Court focused on the site
of the information disclosed by the beeper. 4 The Court
held this monitoring did not constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment, since the beeper disclosed the location
of the container in public places and revealed nothing to the
police about the interior of Knotts' cabin.45
In United States v. Karo,46 the Court addressed the
issue of whether the installation of a beeper in a container
constituted a "search" if the original owner gave consent to
the monitoring yet the buyer had no knowledge of the
presence of the beeper.47 In this instance, the Court found
that the person who possessed the container at the time of
the installation was the confidential informant; therefore,
the police had the consent of the owner prior to installing
48the tracking device. This is the first mention of
installation possibly triggering the Fourth Amendment.49
The Court also considered the monitoring of the
container as it moved from a public area to inside a private
residence as it had in Knotts.50 Since the beeper in Karo
disclosed information not available from visual surveillance
but rather revealed critical facts about the interior of the
premises, the Court decided the monitoring violated the
Fourth Amendment.' The Court felt that requiring a
warrant to monitor private areas would have the effect of
ensuring that the use of electronic beepers or tracking
devices would not be abused.
43 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
44 Id. at 281-82.
45 Id. at 285.
46 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
47 Id. at 707.
48 Id. at 711.
49 Id. at 713.
5o Id. at 713-14.
5' Id. at 714.
52 Id. at 716.
11
9.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 18
Knotts and Karo created the framework for law
enforcement to follow when using electronic beepers and
tracking devices. Tracking devices were divided into "slap-
on" devices which are battery operated and placed on the
undercarriage of vehicles, and devices that are installed or
hard wired into the car so that the device no longer needs a
battery. Monitoring also became divided into two areas:
those instances in which there would only be monitoring in
public places and those with monitoring in private areas.
Congress gave the courts the authority to review
warrants for mobile tracking devices in Title 18, United
States Code, section 3117. In instances in which the
tracking device was to be installed or hard wired into the
car and/or instances in which the tracking device was to
monitor private areas, a warrant containing probable cause
was needed.53 Thus, the only time law enforcement would
not be required to seek a court order would be in a situation
where a "slap-on" tracking device would be used or law
enforcement intended to monitor only public areas.
Knotts and Karo were decided in the 1980's and
much has changed in tracking device technology. Law
enforcement used to place a tracking device on a vehicle
and follow a blip on the screen as they attempted to
maintain surveillance a block or two away. The global
positioning system (GPS) tracking technology that the
Court in Jones examined in 2012 is much more
sophisticated and extensive.54 The Court was suddenly
faced with advanced technology and the only area of
tracking device law still in dispute was the warrantless
utilization of a "slap-on" device and the monitoring of only
public areas. Many assumed the Court would follow the
D.C. Circuit court's argument and use the mosaic theory of
privacy to justify a warrant requirement. Under the mosaic
theory of privacy, extensive monitoring of a vehicle for
53 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2012).
54 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
12
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twenty-eight days constituted more than just a day's
surveillance of a vehicle in public thoroughfares and when
all of the vehicle's movements were taken together after the
twenty-eight day period, the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the sum of his movements.55
Instead, the majority of the Court chose a different
route. The Court explained that it had never truly
abandoned the argument that a physical trespass triggers
the Fourth Amendment, but that the centuries-old torts of
trespass to land and trespass to chattel merely
supplemented the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis. 56 Therefore, utilizing a "slap-on" tracking device
constitutes a "search" because it is a trespass of a person's
"effect", chattel, which is protected by the Fourth
Amendment.57 Justice Scalia likened a GPS "slap-on"
tracking device, which is approximately the size of a credit
card, to an 18 1h century constable "concealing himself in
the target's coach in order to track its movements."58 Both
investigatory tools would constitute a trespass on a person's
effect or chattel.59
The majority decided not to utilize the Katz analysis
in Jones because "[the Court's] cases suggest that such
visual observation is constitutionally permissible."60
However, the majority did not close the door to further
5 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562-63 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(using mosaic theory to conclude that individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in collective movements).
56 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 952.
5 Id. at 953. Justice Scalia mentions in footnote 5 that "[t]respass alone
does not qualify, but there must be conjoined with that what was
present here: an attempt to find something or to obtain information."
Id. at 951 n.5. Since law enforcement is usually going to trespass on
land or a person's property when they are conducting an investigation,
this point that you need "trespass +" is somewhat diminished. Id. at
951.
"Id. at 950 n. 3.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 953-54.
13
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argument if this extensive monitoring by GPS tracking
devices was to arise again in a separate case under different
circumstances, "[i]t may be that achieving the same result
through electronic means, without an accompanying
trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the
present case does not require us to answer that question.
And answering it affirmatively leads us needlessly into
additional thorny problems." 61
In a nutshell, it was questionable to the majority
whether this sort of monitoring actually violated Jones'
right to privacy. In an age of Facebook, Twitter, Google,
iPads, smartphones, etc., the Court was not ready to decide
how much government monitoring of information placed in
the public domain would trigger protections under the
Fourth Amendment. However, the majority did note that
"[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of
electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to
Katz analysis." 62 So owner- or factory-installed tracking
devices such as Onstar or GPS tracking using smartphones
would be subject to the Katz analysis since the trespass
argument would not apply.
Although Jones is a 9-0 decision, the concurrences
by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, demonstrate divergent views
as to the use of trespass and the Katz analysis in
determining which investigatory tools constitute a "search"
and which do not. Justice Alito criticized the majority's
decision to re-introduce the idea of trespass through
property law into the Fourth Amendment context and
preferred to examine the problem utilizing the Katz
analysis.63 Justice Alito first argued that the placement of a
"slap-on" tracking device on the undercarriage of Jones'
61 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 954.
62 Id. at 953 (emphasis in original).
63 Id. at 957-58 (Alito, J., concurring).
14
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64vehicle was not a true trespass to chattel. Liability for a
trespass to chattel occurs when an actor intentionally
dispossesses another of the chattel or intermeddles with a
chattel in the possession of another.65 The elements of
trespass to chattel include an act, intent, an invasion of
chattel interest (either an intermeddling or dispossession 66),
and the plaintiff must be in possession or entitled to
67immediate possession, causation, and damages.
In the Jones case, the placement of the GPS device
would be considered "intermeddling" as no substantial
invasion of the chattel interest occurred. As Justice Alito
pointed out in his concurrence, "there was no actual
damage to the vehicle to which the GPS device was
attached."68 Under the common law definition of trespass
to chattel, the intermeddling would not constitute a trespass
to chattel and therefore would not be a search under the
Fourth Amendment because no actual damage occurred to
the vehicle.69 Justice Alito also disagreed that the Court
should look to 18th century law and apply it to advanced
technology.70 Referring to Justice Scalia's 18th century
example of trespass, Justice Alito argued that a constable in
1791 could not have possibly hidden inside a stage coach to
survey the target's activities. Therefore, the Court need not
concern itself with exploring the past to provide insight on
present-day technological dilemmas. 7 ' According to Justice
64 Id.
65 Id. at 957, n. 2.
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965). A dispossession
would include a wrongful acquisition of the chattel, wrongful transfer,
wrongful detention, substantially changing the chattel, severely
damaging or destroying the chattel, or misusing the chattel.
67 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965).
68 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 957 n. 2 (Alito, J., concurring).
69 Id. (Alito, J. concurring).
7o Id. at 958 (Alito, J. concurring).
71 Id. at 958 n. 3 (Alito, J. concurring).
15
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Alito, as technology advanced and physical intrusion was
no longer at issue trespass no longer applied.72
The issue in Justice Alito's mind was the
government's long-term monitoring of Jones' movements
in his car and whether this long term monitoring "involved
a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not
have anticipated." 73 Alito argued "the use of longer term
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 74
impinges on expectations of privacy." 75 Justice Alito
applied the Katz analysis, rather than trespass law, in his
concurrence and arrived at the same result as Justice
Scalia 76. However, it is interesting to note that Alito
questioned a reasonable person's set of privacy
expectations in our advanced technological age. Noting:
[T]echnology can change those
expectations. Dramatic technological change
may lead to periods in which popular
expectations are in flux and may ultimately
produce significant changes in popular
attitudes. New technology may provide
increased convenience or security at the
expense of privacy, and many people may
find the tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the
public does not welcome the diminution of
privacy that new technology entails, they
72 Id. at 960 ("The premise that property interests control the right of
the Government to search and seize has been discredited." quoting
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)) (Alito, J. concurring).
Citing Oliver, Justice Alito also pointed out that it is unclear how the
placement of a tracking device constitutes a "search." Id. citing Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984).
73 Id. at 964 (Alito, J. Concurring).
74 It is unclear what offenses Justice Alito is speaking of - would long-
term monitoring of a terrorist suspect be acceptable but not of a
suspected drug trafficker?
7 Id. (Alito, J. concurring)
76 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J. concurring).
16
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may eventually reconcile themselves to this
new development as inevitable.77
Alito appeared to question in an age of advanced
technology, where one's personal comments, preferences,
and behavioral information can be so easily exploited by
citizens, companies, and internet entities, whether a
reasonable person can have any expectation to the right of
privacy.
Justice Sotomayor took a different stance on the
privacy issue. While agreeing with both Scalia's and
Alito's reasoning and conclusions, she took the opportunity
in her concurrence to express her concern that "GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations."78  In fact, Sotomayor warned
"[a]wareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms," and this relatively
inexpensive, easy mechanism of monitoring is "susceptible
to abuse." 79 Justice Sotomayor agreed with the appellate
court's mosaic privacy theory where there is a reasonable
"expectation of privacy in the sum of one's public
movements."80
7 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 962 (footnote omitted).
7 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J.. concurring).
7 Id. at 956. James Otis made a similar expression of abuse when
British customs officials abused the writs of assistance granted by the
King. When King George II died in 1760, Otis represented a group of
colonists who opposed the writs, arguing in a Boston court that the
writs were unconstitutional and violated the right to property protected
by the British Constitution. Otis argued it infringed on colonists' liberty
because the writs allowed government officials to enter any citizen's
home without cause. UNITED STATES HISTORY: JAMES OTIS,
http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/hl204.html (last visited July 26,
2012).80Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956.
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While Sotomayor concurs with the majority, she
disagrees with Alito's comments that citizens should come
to terms with their diminishing right to privacy. In fact,
Sotomayor asks in light of this new digital age where
people now disclose a great deal of information about
themselves in many different venues, if the Court should
reconsider the third-party doctrine. I The third-party
doctrine allows law enforcement to request bank records,
company records, hotel records, electronic toll collection
systems, email subscriber and address information, phone
numbers dialed or received, and the like, on the premise
that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy to
information which is willingly provided to these third
parties, thus transferring the information into the public
domain. 82
Law enforcement is required to submit a grand jury
subpoena in order to receive this type of information.
However, law enforcement need only demonstrate that the
information is "relevant to the general subject of the grand
jury investigation." 83 Thus, grand jury subpoenas are
merely a tool to obtain evidentiary material that can be used
without having to worry that the Fourth Amendment
requirements of probable cause or reasonable suspicion will
not be satisfied.
Sotomayor requested a reconsideration of the third-
party doctrine which, in a sense, was not at issue in the
Jones case. "I would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to
Fourth Amendment protection." 84 One thing is clear from
the Jones decision: the Court is re-introducing the
"Id. at 957.
82 Id.
83 United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991). See
FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 17(c).
84 Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 957.
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common-law tort of trespass as an argument to be made
under the Fourth Amendment. The standard expectation of
privacy is now under debate, and all technical investigatory
tools currently not considered a "search" will more than
likely be revisited.
The immediate impact of Jones on law enforcement
activities was minimal, or at least should have been, since
Jones only dealt with the narrow category of small, "slap-
on" devices monitored in public areas. The majority of the
GPS tracking devices already needed a warrant if installed
or if the monitoring was to include private areas. The fact
that so many GPS trackers needed to be pulled from
vehicles post-Jones demonstrates that many agents felt that
"slap-on" devices intended to monitor public areas were
acceptable without a warrant.
Further, many agents followed their legal counsel's
guidance, intending to remember to turn the device off
when it appeared as though the target was traveling into a
private area. It is certainly easier to slap on a tracking
device in the field rather than travel to the U.S. Attorney's
office and a judge's chamber to obtain a warrant in the off
chance the vehicle may be monitored in a private area.
Agents followed the Karo and Knotts case law to the letter
rather than take the precaution of obtaining a warrant. This
guidance was reflected when FBI General Counsel Andrew
Weismann commented that in light of Jones, over 3,000
tracking devices had to be removed from various vehicles
by the FBI."
Certain aspects of the Jones decision will negatively
impact law enforcement's ability to place a tracking device
on a vehicle when exigent circumstances arise. If agents
need to monitor an informant or undercover agent during a
8 Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Ruling Prompts FBI to Turn Off
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sting operation or drug buy bust, and an unexpected third
party arrives on the scene, agents will no longer be able to
follow these other unexpected targets via a tracking device
without comprising the planned operation.
Similar circumstances arise in situations where law
enforcement is listening to a target's phone conversations
via a Title III court order86 and learn that the target plans to
drive to a location to pick up contraband. Unfortunately, if
the target owns three different vehicles, and agents are
unsure of which vehicle the target plans to take; the
authorities are also unsure which vehicle they should
mention in their request to the judge for placement and
monitoring of a tracking device. In the previous scenario,
post-Jones, law enforcement will be unable to place a
tracking device on the three vehicles without a court order.
Will it be possible for law enforcement to receive
an "anticipatory" tracking order to place tracking devices
on all three cars and the monitoring of which depends upon
whether the target decides to take that particular vehicle to
his destination? Exigent circumstances will always exist for
the quick placement of tracking devices during an
investigatory operation and legislators should step forward
and create a 24-hour waiver rule that would allow for these
unplanned contingencies. There should also be
allowances made for the quick slap-on of the device and
brief monitoring while in the field conducting surveillance,
but which would require a court order for its subsequent
monitoring hours later. This type of rule would allow law
enforcement the freedom to make quick decisions in the
field and prevent the type of long-term monitoring that
concerned the Justices in Jones.
Jones' long-term impact on future case law is
difficult to assess, since there are many unanswered
86 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
87 This was alluded to by Justice Alito in his concurring opinion. See
Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 964.
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questions about technology and privacy issues. Is Justice
Alito correct in his conclusion that as people embrace more
technology, their expectation of privacy diminishes? Or is
Justice Sotomayor correct in her argument that the increase
of private information collected by third parties should not
correlate to the government's ability to access this vast
amount of private information without due process?
Should different rules apply to the government and private
entities in their collection of our electronic information?
Such an assumption creates a false dichotomy. Yes,
government has a different motive for the analysis and
review of collected electronic data than does a company
such as Google. Since Google collects what users search
for on the Internet, what websites users visit, and what
news and blog posts users read, does this constitute an
intrusion into a user's expectation of privacy? Should
motive play a role in what constitutes trespass or
expectation of privacy?
In some instances, private entities have similar
motives to that of the government. Private investigators are
similar to law enforcement when they conduct
investigations in cases of infidelity, divorce, family,
criminal, and civil concerns. Law enforcement and private
entities should both be bound by the same constraints and
legal limitations when it comes to their access to technical
investigative techniques or third party data. Thus, civil law
that limits the actions of the private investigator should be
examined to determine how it differs from the criminal law
that applies to government.
IV. Private Investigators, Trespass, and the
Invasion of Privacy
Private investigators typically utilize surveillance
either using photography or video to document, database
searches, GPS tracking to locate people or assets, and
perform crime scene reviews. Private investigators are
21
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concerned with two things: licensing requirements and tort
liability. The prerequisites to become a licensed private
investigator are not difficult. For example, in Tennessee, an
applicant must be twenty-one years of age, a United States'
citizen, not been declared incompetent by reason of mental
defect or disease, not be suffering from habitual
drunkenness or narcotics addiction, be of good moral
character, possess or employ at least one person who has at
least 2,000 hours of "compensated verifiable investigatory
experience,"8 and score at least a seventy percent on a
multiple choice exam consisting of fifty questions. 89
The sparse licensing requirements do not pose
serious obstacles to private investigators; however,
potential tort liability is a problem. Not surprisingly, the
torts of trespass and invasion of privacy are at the forefront
of the investigators' concerns, invasion of privacy more so
than trespass, since trespass requires actual damages to the
land or chattel whereas invasion of privacy can be
subjective. Often, private investigators have intruded on
another's land or chattel but have not caused any actual
damage; therefore, the plaintiff cannot recover. It is when
the investigator intrudes upon a plaintiffs "seclusion,
solitude, or private affairs," 90 that the line is crossed, and
investigators begin worry about being sued personally by
the plaintiff seeking restitution.
In the civil context, many courts have defined a
citizen's right to privacy and have followed the Second
Restatement of Torts' definition of invasion of privacy.
88 Apprenticeships qualify under this requirement. TENN. COMP. R. &
REGS. 1175-01-.19 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-26-206 (2009);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-26-207 (2009).
89 Priometric, Canidate Information Bulletin State of Tennessee Private
Investigation and Polygraph Examinations,
https://www.prometric.com/en-
us/clients/Tennessee/Documents/TN25PrivatelnvestigationCIB_20120
809.pdf. See generally, TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-26-205 (2012).
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
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The Supreme Court of Georgia described the right to
privacy as:
[A] personal right, which is not without
judicial recognition. It is the complement of
the right to the immunity of one's person.
The individual has always been entitled to
be protected in the exclusive use and
enjoyment of that which is his own. The
common law regarded his person and
property as inviolate, and he has the absolute
right to be let alone. The principle is
fundamental, and essential in organized
society, that every one, in exercising a
personal right and in the use of his property,
shall respect the rights and properties of
others.91
The intrusion upon one's seclusion, solitude, or
private affairs is described in the Second Restatement as
"[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person."92 In order to recover, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant penetrated some
zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or
obtained unwanted access to data about the plaintiff, and he
or she had an objectively reasonable expectation of
seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data
source.9 3
91 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 78 (1905)
(Internal citations omitted).
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (emphasis added).
93 Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharmaceuticals, 86 Cal. App. 4th 365, 372
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001)(citing Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955
P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998).
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This interference into one's seclusion must also be
substantial and result from conduct that would be offensive
and objectionable to the ordinary person. 94 In determining
the "offensiveness" of an invasion of a privacy interest,
common law courts consider, among other things: "the
degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and
circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the
intruder's motives and objectives, the setting into which he
intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is
invaded." 95 The Restatement further provides a few
examples of invasion of privacy, such as: "(1) taking the
photograph of a woman in the hospital with a rare disease
that arouses public curiosity over her objection, and (2)
using a telescope to look into someone's upstairs bedroom
window for two weeks and taking intimate pictures with a
telescopic lens." 96
In Villanova v. Innovative Investigations, Inc.,97 "a
private investigator suggested that Mrs. Villanova place a
GPS device in one of the family vehicles regularly driven
by the plaintiff/husband in order to assist in tracking his
whereabouts." 98 The husband could not sue the investigator
for trespass because the investigator had obtained the
wife's consent, and the vehicle was joint marital property. 99
94 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, comt. d (1977). "The
thing into which there is intrusion or prying must be private ... on the
public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no legal right
to be alone; and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than
follow him about and watch him there." PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 808-09 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 4th ed. 1971).
9 Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994)
(quoting Miller v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986)).
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, comment b (1977).
9 Villanova v. Innovative Investigations, Inc. 21 A.3d 650 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2011).
98 Id. at 651.
99 Mrs. Villanova paid the vehicle's insurance premiums out of a joint
account held by her and plaintiff. Id. at 652.
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However, installation was not at issue. Rather, the husband
sued the investigator for invasion of privacy. The court
learned that the GPS device had remained in the vehicle for
about forty days.100 After reviewing the investigator's
invoice, which reflected that a total of twenty-seven hours
were devoted to monitoring the plaintiff via GPS for six
weeks, the court determined that the GPS device did not
capture any movements in a secluded location that was not
in public view.10 t Since the plaintiffs movements were not
continuously monitored and no monitoring "extended into
private or secluded locations that were out of public view
and in which plaintiff had a legitimate expectation of
privacy," no invasion of privacy occurred.102
Upon review of cases in which private investigators
are sued for trespass and/or invasion of privacy, it appears
as if the invasion of privacy must be substantial in order for
the plaintiff to prevail. For example, the plaintiff prevailed
when a private investigator gained admittance to the
plaintiffs hospital room and, by deception, secured the
address of the man who had accompanied the plaintiff on a
shopping trip to Sears.103 Plaintiffs also prevailed when an
investigator peered through the plaintiffs bedroom and
bathroom windows,104 when a private investigator entered
the home and installed a hidden videotape camera in the
bedroom ceiling which recorded the plaintiff undressing,
10 Id.
'0 Id. at 653-55.
102 Id. at 656. Interestingly, the court referred to Knotts. Villanova, 21
A.3d. at 657. "[T]he placement of a GPS device in plaintiffs vehicle
without his knowledge, but in the absence of evidence that he drove the
vehicle into a private or secluded location that was out of public view
and in which he had a legitimate expectation of privacy, does not
constitute the tort of invasion of privacy." Id. at 651-52.
103 Noble v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d 654, 657 (Cal. Ct.
A p. 1973).
Pappa v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America, No. 3:07-CV-
0708, 2008 WL 744820, *2 (M.D. Pa. March 18, 2008).
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showering, and going to bed, 05 and when a private
investigator repeatedly followed a pregnant woman who
was frequently alone or with her small children,
photographing her at least 40 times, repeatedly causing her
to become frightened, resulting in her fleeing her home and
to call the police seeking help. 06
However, courts did not find an invasion of privacy
in instances where investigators placed a camera against a
pharmacy window, used spotlights to illuminate the interior
of the pharmacy, and videotaped the plaintiff talking on the
telephone inside the store for approximately thirteen
seconds,1 07 where a private investigator was across the road
from plaintiffs' property so that he could see the front and
side of the house, including plaintiffs' bedroom windows
which were not covered by curtains, os where private
105 Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 355 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). "To
prove trespass, a plaintiff must show that the defendants intentionally
and without authorization entered real property actually or
constructively possessed by him at the time of the entry." Id. There was
sufficient evidence to show that defendants intentionally entered the
premises and that plaintiff had possession at that time. As to the
invasion of privacy claim, "[p]laintiff has every reasonable expectation
of privacy in his mail and in his home and bedroom. A jury could
conclude that these invasions would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person." Id. at 354.
106 Anderson v. Mergenhagen, 642 S.E.2d 105, 110 (Ga. App. Jan. 17,
2007).
107 Mark v. Seattle Times, 635 P.2d 1081, 1085 (1981). The place from
which the film was shot was open to the public and thus any passerby
could have viewed the scene recorded by the camera. Id. at 1095.
"Since the intrusion in the present case was a minimal one, publication
lasted only 13 seconds, Mark was not shown in any embarrassing
positions, his facial features were not recognizable, we hold there could
be no actionable claim in these circumstances." Id. Compare to
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971), where the court
found an actionable intrusion when the press gained entrance by
subterfuge to the home of an accused and photographed him there.
'os Hall v. InPhoto Surveillance, 649 N.E. 2d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(finding that no trespass was committed). "In the absence of any
evidence to support the claim of actual trespass or the taking of
26
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investigators conducted visual surveillance while in a car
parked on the street and the plaintiff was on the balcony
and a videotape was made showing the plaintiff walking
around her apartment without the use of crutches or a
cane,109 and when a private investigator drove to a yacht
club, waited until a club member opened the gate, drove
onto the grounds before the gate closed, parked his vehicle
in a parking lot for guests and videotaped the plaintiffs
without their consent.110 In Nunez v. S. Melgar
investigations, Inc., II pretext telephone calls, pretext door
knocks, and incidents of climbing the back yard fence to
photographs, summary judgment was properly granted to defendants."
Id. at 86.
109 Digirolamo v. D.P. Anderson & Assocs., No. Civ. A. 97-3623, 1999
WL 345592, at *1 (Mass. Supp. May 26, 1999). "[C]ourts are expected
to define the scope of the right to privacy 'on a case-by-case basis, by
balancing relevant factors, . . . and by considering prevailing societal
values and the ability to enter orders which are practical and capable of
reasonable enforcement." Id. at *2 (quoting Schlesinger v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1991)).
Visual surveillance which consists only of observing, photographing, or
videotaping a person in a public place violates no right of privacy. Id.
(citing Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 939, Since plaintiff
was in plain view of anyone on the street while on the balcony, she
enjoyed no greater right to be free of enhanced viewing than she did
while standing on the street. Id. at *5. Therefore, the observation and
photographing of the plaintiff with enhanced vision while on that
balcony did not by itself constitute an unreasonable and substantial or
serious interference with privacy under G.L. c. 214, s IB. Id. at *4.
110 Furman v. Sheppard, 744 A.2d 583 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
"Not every trespass constitutes an unreasonable search or intrusion. A
trespass 'becomes relevant only when it invades a defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy."' Id. at 586 (quoting McMilliam v.
State, 584 A.2d 88, 97 nt. 5(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)). Business and
commercial enterprises generally are not as private as a residence.
Since the surveillance was nothing more than observations while they
were on or near a yacht situated in a public waterway and in open view
of the public, there was no invasion of privacy. Id. at 587.
11 Nunez v. S. Investigations Inc., No. B 162945, 2004 WL 1926794 at
*9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004),.
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peer into her window created a triable issue as to whether
the defendants intruded into a private place.
V. Applying Civil Tort Liability to Fourth
Amendment Law
Much can be learned from the development of
trespass and invasion of privacy in the civil context. First,
trespass is infrequently proven as plaintiffs can rarely
demonstrate actual damages. It is interesting to see how the
Court's reliance on trespass in Jones, which now exacts the
power of the exclusionary rule, is not as important in the
civil arena. A civil action for trespass seeks compensation
for damages to property.112 An intrusion of privacy "is a
claim that is 'broad enough to include recovery for
economic injuries, as well as mental or physical
injuries." l3 Trespass is no longer in fashion in the civil
world as it is gearing up for prominence in the criminal
context. If trespass is now in vogue, other investigatory
tools may be in jeopardy.
The FBI General Counsel commented that they
were considering the impact of Jones as it pertained to trash
pulls.11 4 If the lid of the trash can is considered an "effect"
under the Fourth Amendment, an agent's act of touching
the lid may be considered a trespass and would be a Fourth
Amendment violation without first acquiring a warrant. In
the civil context, documents which are placed in an outdoor
trash barrel no longer retain their character as the plaintiffs
personal property, the items discarded are considered
abandoned." Under the civil precedent, agents need not
112 Hawkes v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 764 A.2d 258 (Me. 2001).
"' Id. at 263.
114 de Vogue, supra note 83 (Weissman is quoted as saying "there is
not reason to think this is just going to end with GPS").
115 Ananda Church of Self Realization v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 116 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 370, 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). But See Misseldine v.
Corporate Investigative Servs., Inc., No. 1771, 2003 WL 21234928, at
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worry about the retrieval of the abandoned items; however,
they must wait until the trash is in a public area or face
trespass issues on private property.
The open fields doctrine may also not withstand
scrutiny under a trespass analysis. The open fields doctrine
states that people do not have an expectation of privacy in
activities occurring in open fields, even if the police drive
past a locked gate, a no trespassing sign, and owners tell
them it is private property; what a person knowingly
exposes to the public is not protected. 116 In the civil
context, a similar set of facts would clearly constitute a
trespass if damages as a result of the physical invasion of
the land were proven.1 7 The majority in Jones provided a
preview of how the court would rule on an open field
question, stating in the opinion that "an open field, unlike
the curtilage of a home is not one of those protected areas
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment." 118 This comment is
contrary to the idea that personal property is a "place"
protected under the Fourth Amendment just as the vehicle
in Jones was considered an "effect" protected under the
Fourth as well. A trespass on the undercarriage of one's
vehicle is just as much a trespass as entering one's personal
property to conduct surveillance. Based on this premise, the
open fields doctrine is in jeopardy.
*4-5 (Ohio Ct. App. May 29, 2003) (holding that a trespass was
committed when the private investigator stepped out of the car, took the
garbage, and physically invaded the plaintiffs property without
invitations). However, in Misseldine v. Corporate Investigative Servs.,
Inc., No. 81771, 2003 WL 21234928 (Ohio App. May 29, 2003), a
trespass was committed when the private investigator stepped out of the
car and took his garbage. Id. at *4. The investigator physically invaded
the plaintiff's property without invitation or inducement. Id. at *5.
16 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (citing Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)).
117 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F.Supp.2d 602, 606 (N.D. Miss.
2004).
" Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953Icitations omitted).
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Some undercover law enforcement recordings of
criminal suspects, currently legal under the one-party
consent rule, may now be jeopardized under certain
circumstances. The Court may adopt a civil invasion of
privacy standard or consider capturing a party's words
without their knowledge through the use of a recording
device a "trespass." Federal law permits private citizens to
record unknowing third parties except if the
"communication is intercepted for the purpose of
committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any
State."I19 Various states have banned eavesdropping of
confidential communications criminally and civilly under
the invasion of privacy tort.120 While some civil cases of
119 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(d), 2520 (2012) (civil action).
120 Kersis v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 1994 WL 774531 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1994). Ca. Penal Code § 632(a) regarding
"confidential communications" states that "every person who,
intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential
communication, by means of any electronic amplifying or recording
device, eavesdrops upon or records the confidential communication,
whether the communication is carried on among the parties in the
presence of one another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or other
device, except a radio, shall be punished . . ." The following is a list of
eavesdropping laws by state: ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-31 (2012); ALASKA
STAT. ANN. §§ 42.20.300, 42.20.310 (West 2012); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3005 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120 (West 2012);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-
304 (West 2012); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 53a-189 (West 2012); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1335 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03
(West 2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (West 2012); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 803-42 (West 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6702 (West
2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-2 (West 2012); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-33.5-5-4 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (West
2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101 (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 526.020 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 15:1303 (2011); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 710 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., Interceptions,
Procurements, Disclosures or use of Communication § 10-402 (West
2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2012); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
30
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surreptitious recordings were found to contain a triable
issue of fact for the jury whether the plaintiff had a
reasonable expectation of privacy at the place of their
employment or home,121 most of the time, courts (despite
the state ban on eavesdropping) determine that no invasion
of privacy exists when one is videotaped or recorded even
inside their own home by one party in the presence of
another. The plaintiffs simply have no reasonable
expectation that the conversation would be kept in
626A.02 (West 2012); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-533 (West 2011);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 542.402 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-
213 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-290 (2012); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN
§§ 200.620, 200.650 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2
(2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3 (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
30-12-1 (West 2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2012);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-287 (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 12.1-15-02 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52
(West 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1202 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 165.540 (West 2012); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5703 (West
2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-5.1-13 (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-17-470 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-21-1, 23A-35A-20
(2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-601 (West 2012); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art 18.20 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-402
(West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (West 2012); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-lD-3
(West 2012); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 968.31 (West 2011); WYo. STAT.
ANN. § 7-3-702 (West 2012). The only state that did not have an
eavesdropping criminal or civil statute is Vermont. Vermont does
reference the United States Code's prohibition on eavesdropping, but
this is included only in the statute that prohibits disturbing the peace by
use of telephones or electronic devices. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1027
121 Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 1994 WL 774531 at *8 ; Hawkes v. Private
Investigation Services of Maine and New England, Inc., 2000 WL
33721625 at *4 (Me. Super. 2000). Hawkes alleges that the private
investigator twice gained access to his home under false pretenses and
without identifying himself. Id. at *1. Summary judgment on the
invasion of privacy claim was denied. Id. at*4. Summary judgment on
the plaintiffs claim of trespass was also denied because consent for
those entries was obtained by misrepresenting the identity of the visitor
and the purpose of entry.
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confidence or recorded to later share with others.122 The
invasion of privacy is found to be de minimis, especially if
the recording was made in public view in a public place.123
It would be a significant blow to law enforcement if
warrants were required to record conversations between
informants/undercover agents and potential targets. As it
currently stands in the criminal context, the Court in Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966), decided that
[t]he risk of being overheard by an
eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or
deceived as to the identity of one with whom
one deals is probably inherent in the
conditions of human society. It is the kind of
risk we necessarily assume whenever we
speak . . . no right protected by the Fourth
Amendment was violated in the present
case.124
In 1971, the Court affirmed this decision in United
States v. White and has never reverted back to the trespass
theory when revisiting the issue. 125 Comparing the federal
criminal stance to the civil stance on surreptitious
recordings, and taking the state criminal eavesdropping
statutes out of the mix, it is clear that most courts permit
surreptitious recordings in the civil context as long as it
does not rise to the level of an invasion of privacy an act
122 Deteresa v. Am. Broad. Co., Inc., 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation that the
conversation with the ABC reporter would not be divulged to anyone
else) Id at 465.
123 Id at 466.
124 The Court clarified its decision in Heffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 303(citing Lopez v. U.S. 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963)) that
surreptitious recordings by "false friends" were not a search in United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
125 White, 401 U.S. 745.
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which is highly offensive to the reasonable person.12 The
requirement that the intrusion be "highly offensive to a
reasonable person" would be a welcome
addition/supplement to the Katz analysis. Not only would
there need to be an objective and subjective expectation of
privacy, but law enforcement's actions would have to be
highly offensive and objectionable to the ordinary person.
This would make the Katz analysis more difficult to prove,
but it would limit the types of tools and actions that would
be considered a "search" requiring a warrant.
Lastly, third party database searches which are
clearly of concern to Justice Sotomayor are not a concern in
the civil context. Private investigators have access to a
plethora of information while conducting background
checks, financial and insurance fraud investigations,
workers compensation investigations, and asset/property
searches.1 27 The searches range from residential history
searches, area demographics, aliases/date of birth and other
names used, federal litigation searches, motor vehicle
ownership, watercraft ownership, aircraft ownership, real
property ownership, corporation ownership, judgment and
lien search, bankruptcy search, criminal history search,
incarceration history search, employment search, UCC
126 See Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc.,
306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002). Although the plaintiff argued that he had
a subjective expectation of privacy in Medical Laboratory's
administrative offices, he extended the invitation to the three ABC
representatives who were strangers to him. Id. at 813 His willingness to
invite strangers into the offices for a meeting and tour indicated that he
did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. The
plaintiff did not reveal any information about his personal life, but
rather his business operations. Thus, the plaintiff had no expectation of
privacy in the contents of his conversations with ABC representatives.
Id. at 814. Any intrusion by ABC representatives in secretly recording
their meeting with the plaintiff was de minimis and not highly offensive
to a reasonable person. Id. at 819.
127 See CRISPIN SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, INC.,
www.crispininvestigations.com (last visited July 30, 2012).
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filings, Internet domain ownership search, driver's licenses,
FAA pilots, professional licenses, voter registration,
concealed weapons permits, relative searches,
hunting/fishing permits, sexual offender lists, etc.128 The
ability for private parties to retrieve personal information
from other third parties has become relatively easy-if one
pays for the database search.129 As citizens use more
technology and expose themselves to the collection of
additional data, their expectation of privacy decreases.
Therefore, the majority in Jones seems to identify that the
Katz expectation of privacy analysis may soon no longer
apply as citizens' privacy is lost. Technology has become a
double-edged sword. However, if private investigators have
the ability to sort through databases to collect a target's
information, law enforcement should have the same ability.
The third party doctrine that Sotomayor wants to
revisit should remain intact unless Congress intervenes and
decides to enact a consumer "privacy bill of rights."' 30 To
128 Id.
129 Telephone Interview with Robert Crispin, CEO, Crispin Special
Investigations, Inc. Very few records can be accessed by law
enforcement via subpoena during the investigative phase that private
investigators cannot access. Database search companies such as Avent
and AutoTrack sweep millions of public records every day gathering all
sorts of data on private individuals. Bank or financial (ie, money wire
transfer) records, cell phone or cell tower records, and power bill
records are some of the few records private investigators may have
difficulty accessing (unless they conduct a series of trash pulls).
However, once the investigative phase is complete and the defendant is
charged, the defense also has subpoena power and can access those
records as well. Oftentimes, those types of records can be found within
a divorce case file in the public database, and the private investigator
no longer needs any type of subpoena power to access this type of
information.
130 Alexei Alexis, Consumer Protection - Privacy: White House
Releases Report Urging New U.S. Privacy Framework, BLOOMBERG
BNA: THE UNITED STATES LAW WEEK, Feb. 28, 2012 (also found at 80
U.S.L.W. 1164). On February 23, 2012, the Obama administration
requested that Congress pass a privacy plan which would require
34
9.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 41
the extent that private entities can access, collect and
analyze sensitive third-party database information, then law
enforcement should enjoy similar unfettered access without
being subjected to scrutiny under the third party doctrine.
If some of these investigatory tools that are
currently not considered a "search" soon become a search
under the trespass analysis, this may pose a significant
burden on law enforcement. These types of tools are
utilized in order to develop sufficient probable cause in
order to obtain a warrant. These tools may fall by the
wayside as did thermal imaging devices after the Kyllo
decision.13 1 Agents simply did not have sufficient probable
cause before using the device; it was merely an aid to
ensure that the home indeed was a marijuana grow-house
prior to requesting a search warrant.
VI. Conclusion
The role of trespass took precedence in Jones, a
decision which diminishes, at least temporarily, the
importance of Katz and the expectation of privacy doctrine
for future decisions on what constitutes a violation of our
Fourth Amendment rights. Until the 2 0 th century, the
businesses to be "transparent about their data-collection practices and
giv[e] consumers the right to access and correct their personal
information," "to exercise control over the collection of their personal
data and how it is used," and to have the right "to 'reasonable' limits on
the collection and retention of personal data." Id. at 1. "'While I look
forward to working with President Obama and Secretary Bryson on this
critically important issue, any rush-to-judgment could have a chilling
effect on our economy and potentially damage, if not cripple, online
innovation,' Rep. Mary Bono Mack (R-Calif.), leader of a House
Energy and Commerce subcommittee that oversees privacy issues, said
in a statement issued after the White House unveiled its report." Id. at
3.
13' Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (holding that thermal imaging is an unlawful
search as it could leave the homewowner at the mercy of advanced
technology that could discern all human acitivities in the homes).
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trespass doctrine was sufficient to determine what
constituted an unlawful search and seizure, an invasion of
our privacy. With the advance of technology, it became
clear that "an actual trespass is neither necessary nor
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation."' 32 The
Katz decision introduced the reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine which supplemented the trespass doctrine.
The Supreme Court's decision on Jones upheld the D.C.
Circuit finding that an attachment of a GPS device to the
defendant's vehicle to monitor the vehicle's movements,
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment on
different grounds. Since the Jones decision was so
narrowly focused on one singular issue, future controversial
cases involving law enforcement use of technology to
monitoring citizens where trespass is not present remain
unresolved. The potential for new intrusions of privacy
absent trespass was a controversy addressed by Congress
when it enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, a comprehensive
guide to wiretapping.133
Going forward in the post-Jones era, it is highly
probable to foresee the outcome when both a trespass and a
person's reasonable expectation of privacy is triggered. It is
also highly probable to predict the outcome when a trespass
does not occur but a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy is triggered. What is most difficult to predict is the
scenario in which a trespass occurs but a person's
reasonable expectation of privacy is not triggered. Will the
open fields doctrine suffer the same fate as tracking
devices? And in the scenario in which a trespass does not
occur but a person's reasonable expectation of privacy is
triggered, will, in time, the Court surrender to the idea that
citizens are giving up their expectation of privacy in the
digital age or will the Court fight this uphill battle and
132 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 960 (Alito, J. concurring) (quoting United States
v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984)).
133 Id. at 963 (Alito, J. concurring).
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strike down the third party doctrine? As suggested by
Justice Alito in his concurrence on Jones, the difficulties
inherent in applying the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures to a 21" century
surveillance technique is problematic, and possibly best left
to Congress which has the authority to write legislation on
the topic.134
Hopefully, either the Court or Congress will also
utilize the well-developed civil case law concerning
trespass and invasion of privacy in the civil context as it
pertains to private investigators, and close the gap between
civil and criminal laws and the limitations placed on the
actions of law enforcement and private investigators. The
United States and its court system strive to uphold the
rights of individuals but not at the expense of the republic.
We strive for Lorenzetti's utopia, a city that is well-
governed, orderly, bright, calm, joyful, hard-working, and
safe - balancing law and order with civil liberties.
Lorenzetti's depiction of a failed government wherein
Tyranny defeats Lady Justice and the "Common Good" is
allegorical and emblematic of this eternal struggle for
balance. Finding the right balance between societal order
and an individual's right to privacy is obviously difficult.
When we sacrifice some of our privacy rights, we hope we
are doing so for the "Common Good."
134 Id. at 958, 964 (Alito, J. concurring).
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